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The Dark Side of Authority:
Antecedents, Mechanisms, and Outcomes
of Organizational Corruption
Ruth V. Aguilera
Abhijeet K. Vadera
ABSTRACT. Corruption poisons corporations in
America and around the world, and has devastating
consequences for the entire social fabric. In this article, we
focus on organizational corruption, described as the abuse
of authority for personal benefit, and draw on Weber’s
three ideal-types of legitimate authority to develop a
theoretical model to better understand the antecedents of
different types of organizational corruption. Specifically,
we examine the types of business misconduct that orga-
nizational leaders are likely to engage in, contingent on
their legitimate authority, motives, and justifications. We
conclude by suggesting managerial implications of our
theoretical model and propose directions for future
research.
KEY WORDS: authority, bureaucracy, corruption,
opportunity, motivation, justification, types of organiza-
tional corruption, weber, white-collar crime
The issue of corruption has been gaining increasing
importance in today’s world. The World Bank has
singled out corruption as the largest obstacle to
economic and social development, and in our
search of the word ‘corruption’ in article headings
in The Wall Street Journal in 2004, the word ap-
peared 496 times. Much evidence also suggests that
corruption is as ancient as disloyalty and greed,
particularly in the context of politics. For example,
in a fourth century B.C. manifesto entitled Artha-
shastra (‘Science of Polity’), Indian political philos-
opher, Kautilya discusses the principles of
governing the state and includes the problem of
corruption. A few centuries later, Machiavelli in
the Prince offers advice on how to rule XIVth
century Florence even in the face of widespread
moral corruption.
Despite the richness of corruption research
in political science and political philosophy, orga-
nizational scholars have only recently started to
systematically explore the causes and consequences
of corruption in the corporate organization (see for
example, Argandona, 2003; Zahra et al., 2005) and
to offer recommendations on how to reduce
corruption, if not eliminate it (Lindgreen, 2004;
Matsumura and Shin, 2005). For example, a survey
by Transparency International identified 4,000 books
and journal articles published on corruption in the
last 10 years, of which 74 percent addressed politics
and public administration and only one percent
focused on business ethics (Global Corruption
Report, 2001, p. 229; Luo, 2004). This relative lack
of research is explained partly by the complexity of
corruption, particularly as it transpires across multi-
ple levels of analysis, and partly by the different
perceptions and definitions of organizational cor-
ruption across societies. Moreover, the secrecy and
illegality surrounding corruption typically precludes
empirical analysis.
In this article, we address some of these concerns
by discussing the causes, mechanisms, and outcomes
of corruption at the organizational level. We draw
on the Opportunity-Motivation-Justification model
of crime1 (also referred to as the ‘fraud triangle’, see
Albrecht et al., 1984; Coleman, 1985; Cressey,
1953) to understand organizational corruption,
which we conceptualize as the use of authority for
personal gain. In this model of crime, opportunity
refers to ‘‘the context or the environment that makes
a possible course of action feasible’’ (McKendall and
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Wagner, 1997, p. 626). Motivation includes factors
that prompt individuals to act in certain ways, and
justifications are socially constructed accounts to
legitimate individuals’ actions (Ashforth and Anand,
2003). Specifically, we contend that different
combinations of opportunity, motivation, and jus-
tification lead to different types of organizational
corruption. We focus on Weber’s construct
of authority2 (Weber, [1922] 1978) as a critical
opportunity for organizational corruption to occur
and to develop a middle-range theoretical
framework based on Weber’s three ideal-types
of authority. In particular, we discuss how members
of an organization with a particular type of authority
(legal-rational, charismatic, or traditional), who are
driven by a particular type of salient motive (indi-
vidualistic, collectivistic, or relational) and who are
able to justify their behavior using a specific tech-
nique (rationalization, socialization, or ritualism) are
likely to commit a certain type of corrupt act (pro-
cedural, schematic, or categorical). These relation-
ships are illustrated in Figure 1. For example, we
argue that members with mostly individualistic
motives in organizations salient with legal-rational
authority, and who largely justify their behavior
using rationalization, are more likely to engage in
procedural type of organizational corruption. We
note that the relationships proposed in this article are
ideal-types as we recognize that none of the sub-
categories of opportunity, motivation, and justifica-
tion exists in pure form, although one subcategory
can be more salient than the others. For instance,
prior research suggests that individuals can have
multiple motives for their behaviors, but it is difficult
to isolate the exact weight of each of them (see
Latham and Pinder, 2005). We also contend that
understanding the relationship among the ideal-types
of opportunity, motivation, and justification, oper-
ationalized as the most salient subcategory, is the first
step to gain a better comprehension of the complex
phenomenon of organizational corruption. Thus, we
focus exclusively on the ideal-type relationships.
We make several contributions to the organiza-
tional and ethics literatures. First, we maintain that to
study corruption in organizations, we need to
understand its genesis. Weber’s three ideal-types of
legitimate authority allow us to unpack the opportu-
nity box in the opportunity-motivation-justification
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Figure 1. The Relationship Between the Interaction of Opportunity, Motivation and Justification, and Types of
Organizational Corruption.
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model and to explore the roots of corruption in
organizations. Also, to our knowledge, no study has
yet looked at Weber’s authority types as a conceptual
tool for grasping the mechanisms and outcomes of
corruption. We, therefore, contribute to the organi-
zational and ethics literatures by analyzing how
authority plays a key role in influencing individuals to
engage in organizational corruption. Second, most
studies on corruption seem to use a broad terminology
to include a wide range of organizational crimes. We
argue that different types of corrupt activities are likely
to emerge from distinct individual and organizational
precedents. In this article, we discuss how Weber’s
three types of authority, in combination with motives
and justifications, provide opportunities to commit
different types of organizational corruption. Third,
although the opportunity-motivation-justification
model discussed below, is gaining increasing impor-
tance in the sociological and accounting literatures on
crime and fraud (Albrecht et al., 1984; Coleman,
1985), there is no study that systematically analyzes the
simultaneous interaction of the three pillars of this
model as an antecedent to organizational corruption.
In this article, we fill this gap in the literature by
suggesting that a combination of one type of oppor-
tunity (authority, in our case) with one type of
motivation and one type of justification may lead to a
particular type of organizational corruption.
This article is organized as follows. We first
explicate the construct of organizational corruption.
Next, we discuss each of the pillars in the oppor-
tunity-motivation-justification model. We then
construe Weber’s ([1922] 1978) three types of
authority to develop our theoretical framework,
which links the interaction of opportunity, motiva-
tion, and justification with types of organizational
corruption. Finally, we propose managerial and
policy implications of our model of organizational
corruption, and suggest possible avenues of future
research.
Organizational corruption
The most widely used definition of corruption,
particularly in the political context, is the abuse (or
misuse) of public power for private (or personal)
benefit (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; Robertson and
Watson, 2004; Rodriguez et al, 2005; Theobald,
1990). This definition encompasses a wide range of
phenomena from an individual favoring one orga-
nization over another in return for some personal
favors to a politician who misappropriates public
assets for personal use. Gaviria (2002) argues that,
although these diverse phenomena may have the
same causes and effects, it is important to distinguish
between at least two types of corruption: one that
involves illegal transactions between public officials
and private parties, and another that does not involve
private parties and mainly refers to acts of politicians
and other government officials. Argandona (2003)
extends this idea further to include acts of corruption
implicating individuals in organizations in the pri-
vate sector and terms it as ‘private-to-private cor-
ruption.’ Following this stream of research, we focus
on the acts of corruption by individuals within
organizations.
A large part of any type of corruption involves the
abuse/misuse of authority. For example, Sherman
(1980) conceptualizes corruption as the illegal misuse
of public authority resulting in private gain for the
agents involved in the acts. Ashforth and Anand
(2003), while discussing how corruption is normal-
ized in organizations, define organizational corrup-
tion as the ‘‘misuse of authority [italics added] for
personal, subunit, and/or organizational gain’’ (p. 2).
However, research focusing on similar conceptual-
izations has been criticized for not specifying what
‘abuse’ or ‘misuse’ mean in this context or what is
meant by ‘public’ authority (see Theobald, 1990 for
a detailed discussion). We clarify the construct of
organizational corruption by defining it as the crime
that is committed by the use of authority within organi-
zations for personal gain. Therefore, we contend that
when individuals endorsing the authority of their
organizations use that authority for their own ben-
efit, then they have committed organizational cor-
ruption. Personal gain may also entail broader
corporate benefits such as higher firm profitability or
longer-term survival of the firm or what appears to
be a corporate crime for the benefit of the organi-
zation may spill over into significant personal gain3
For example, the internal audit report on the fraud at
H. J. Heinz found no evidence that any employee
engaged in fraud for personal gain per se (Mathews
et al., 1991); and the price-fixing collusion in the
folding-box industry during the 1970s was found to
be designed to stabilize prices and control the
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environment, and not for personal gain of the
colluders (Sonnenfeld and Lawrence, 1978). How-
ever, these actions may have also led to job security
and higher chances for promotion for the colluders
(e.g., personal gain). In this article, we assume that
organizational corruption is committed chiefly for
personal benefit, although we do not deny that it
might also be carried out, intentionally or otherwise,
for organizational or subunit gains in addition to
personal gains.
Also, although the construct of authority has been
used in the definition of organizational corruption,
as in, corruption being the use of authority for
personal gain (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Sherman,
1980), prior research has not focused explicitly on
the construct of authority to better understand the
problem of organizational corruption. Weber
([1922] 1978) defines authority as ‘‘the probability
that certain specific commands (or all commands)
will be obeyed by a given group of persons’’
(p. 212). The salience of a certain type of authority
in an organization brings with it certain control
capabilities that organizational leaders and adminis-
trative staff4 may exercise in their organizations.
Therefore, these organizational members are likely
to assume that they will get away with their crimes
due to their authority within the organization.
Authority in an organization, thus, works as an
opportunity for its members to engage in acts
of organizational corruption. We draw on this
Weberian construct of authority to suggest that a
combination of one type of authority with one type
of motivation and one type of justification may
trigger these leaders to engage in certain types of
organizational corruption due to a specific combi-
nation of the capability to exercise control, the desire
to behave in a particular manner and having the
cognitive ability to justify their behaviors. In the
following section, we discuss the opportunity-
motivation-justification model before putting forth
our propositions.
Opportunity-motivation-justification model
The opportunity-motivation-justification model of
crime (see Albrecht et al., 1984; Coleman, 1985;
Cressey, 1953) is based on the notion that the
opportunity for a crime, the motivation to act and
the justification to rationalize these behaviors must
come together for any crime to occur. This implies
that the social-psychological causes and structural
causes of white-collar crime are inseparably inter-
woven, and the presence of all three (opportunity,
motivation, and justification) is necessary for an
individual to engage in crime. We discuss each of
these pillars of the model below.
Opportunity
Opportunity means ‘‘the presence of a favorable
combination of circumstances that makes a possible
course of action possible’’ (McKendall and Wagner,
1997, p. 626). Opportunity, therefore, arises when
individuals or groups can engage in illegal and
unethical behavior and expect, with reasonable
confidence, to avoid detection and punishment. For
example, an oversight of the board of directors may
allow management to manipulate earnings inappro-
priately in order to reach analysts’ forecasts (see
Wilks and Zimbelman, 2004). Opportunity to
commit crimes may include macro- and micro-level
factors. Macro-level factors encompass the charac-
teristics of the industries in which the organization is
embedded such as the market structure (Needleman
and Needleman, 1979), ‘organizational sets’ of an
industry, that is companies whose actions are visible
to each other (Gross, 1978), and variations in the
regulatory environments (Clinard and Yeager,
1980). The more micro-level factors consist of the
occupations of the offenders and also their gender
(Zietz, 1981) and the characteristics of the organi-
zation itself (Bowen, 2004; Clinard, 1983; Conklin,
1977; Kramer, 1982).
None of these studies looks at authority per se in
an organization. The only research related to the
authority of an organization examines the compo-
sition of the board of directors and ownership
structure that is, in Weber’s ([1922], 1978) termi-
nology, the structure of administrative staff of an
organization (Clinard, 1983; Cochran and Nigh,
1987; Frederick and Weber, 1987). However, the
findings on the relationship between organizational
crime and governance structure are mixed and
inconclusive. For instance, Beasley (1996) shows
that firms with higher percentages of outside
members on their boards are less likely to commit
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financial-statement related fraud. On the other hand,
Kesner et al. (1986) demonstrate that the proportion
of outsiders is not significantly related to the number
of illegal acts committed by the firm. Dechow et al.
(1996), while investigating firms that manipulated
their earnings, show that these firms are more likely
to have board of directors dominated by manage-
ment, to have a CEO who simultaneously serves as
chairman of board, to have a CEO as the firm’s
founder and are less likely to have an outside
blockholder (also see Dunn, 2004). However,
Kesner and colleagues (1986) find evidence that
board structure does not indirectly or directly lead to
the commission of illegal acts and that firms in which
one individual serves as both CEO and chairman are
no more likely to be associated with illegal acts than
those in which separate individuals hold these posi-
tions (see also Schnatterly, 2003).
We, therefore, draw on Weber’s ([1922] 1978)
classic work on the legitimate authority of organi-
zations as an opportunity that provides a possible
cause of action and that, in combination with
motivation and justification, will lead to different
corruption outcomes. We specifically focus on the
individual or collective action of the individuals who
endorse the authority in an organization. In other
words, we pay attention to the agents of authority
whom Weber called the leader and his administra-
tive staff. These are the white-collar employees who
in the corporate governance literature are considered
the governing team, i.e., the top management team
and board of directors, and includes, among others,
the chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial
officer (CFO), and, in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley
world, chief risk officer (CRO) as well as middle
managers who can use their organizational authority
for personal gain.
Motivation
Motivation involves personality and cultural factors
that induce individuals to act in ways that neutralize
the strong ethical controls of society. However, no
evidence has been found that supports the hypothesis
that a single set of personality characteristics is con-
ducive to crime in all situations (Coleman, 1985).
Specific cultural factors that lead to crime and
criminal behavior include the desire to ‘make a fast
buck’ (Lane, 1954), the fear of losing what has
already been made (Weisburd et al., 1991), defining
competitive struggle as being positive rather than
negative or selfish (Coleman, 1985), differential
association (Sutherland, 1940) and even the structure
of the industrial economy such as market exchange
and the use of money (Coleman, 1985).
In the context of organizations, individuals typi-
cally have three types of motives that explain their
behavior: individualistic, collectivistic, and rela-
tional5 (Sedikides and Brewer, 2001). Even though
we acknowledge that these motives can co-exist, we
argue that it is the salience of a particular motive that
drives behavior. For example, Aguilera and col-
leagues (Forthcoming) consider three types of mo-
tives as antecedents to a firm engaging in socially
responsible behavior, but emphasize that ‘in practice,
all organizational motives might be working simul-
taneously yet some motives will be more salient than
others.’ By individualistic motives, we mean motives
by which one seeks to maximize one’s own gains
exclusively (McClintock et al., 1973), and these
motives encompass gains that are financial, physical,
or even psychological. Collectivistic motives arise when
individuals consider maximizing not only their own
gains but also those that benefit the organization.
Thus, these motives can develop because of a strong
sense of attachment or identification with the
organization. Relational motives arise when individ-
uals identify not with the organization, but with
a smaller group(s) within the organization. There-
fore, individuals with relational motives are more
concerned with benefiting themselves and a sub-
group within an organization. The subgroup can be
a department or a subunit. Hence, we argue that
these different types of motives may have different
targets of benefit. It is the individual who benefits
when the motives are individualistic, the individual
and the organization benefit when they are collec-
tivistic, and the individual and the subunit benefit
when they are relational.
In other words, individualistic motives are drawn
from Lewin’s concept of instrumental rationality
(1935), whereas collectivistic and relational motiva-
tion are also termed as self-expressive motives,
which suggests that individuals are motivated to
affirm their self-concepts, including their beliefs and
values (Snyder and Ickes, 1985). Also, to reiterate,
we contend that although individuals may be driven
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by all three motives simultaneously, one motive is
more likely to be salient than the others in deter-
mining their behavior.
Justification
Justifications are socially constructed accounts that
individuals who engage in corrupt acts adopt to
legitimate their behavior (Ashforth and Anand,
2003; Loebbecke et al., 1989). Research on cogni-
tive defense mechanisms, self-serving biases, and
ingroup biases, among others (Chen and Tyler,
2001; Sykes and Matza, 1957; Taylor, 1989) share
the notion that groups and individuals are usually
motivated to resolve the ambiguities surrounding
actions that serve their self-interests. Justifications
are, therefore, beliefs that counteract negative
interpretations by articulating why the corrupt acts
are justifiable or excusable exceptions to the norms
(Ashforth and Anand, 2003). Justifications can be
both prospective and retrospective (Coleman, 1985).
Prospective justifications are future-oriented and are
usually adopted by individuals before they engage in
corrupt acts. Retrospective justifications, on the
other hand, are espoused by individuals after
undertaking corrupt acts and tend to be defensive
since they are adduced post-hoc (Ashforth and
Anand, 2003; Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). We assert
that most justifications regarding organizational
corruption are prospective since these acts are more
likely to be intentional and calculated. Hence,
individuals typically justify actions benefiting them-
selves before they participate in them (Wilks and
Zimbelman, 2004).
There exist different categories of justification of
self-interested acts. For example, Sykes and Matza
(1957), referring to juvenile delinquents, suggest five
techniques of neutralization that individuals use to
justify their acts-denial of responsibility, denial of
injury, denial of the victim, condemnation of the
condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties. In
addition to these, Ashforth and Anand (2003) pro-
pose three more techniques that individuals who
engage in corruption may adopt, including legality,
social weighting (broader category of ‘condemnation
of the condemners’), metaphor of the ledger (i.e.,
claiming entitlement to engage in deviant behav-
iors), and refocusing attention (i.e., deemphasizing,
compartmentalizing, or suppressing knowledge of
the illicit acts). Taking into account these tech-
niques, we propose three over-arching justifications
that include the justification techniques suggested by
both, Sykes and Matza (1957) and Ashforth and
Anand (2003): rationalization, socialization, and rit-
ualism. Rationalization justifications refer to individ-
uals justifying their actions by arguing that their acts
may not be criminal since there may be no direct
victim. Also, individuals who use rationalization
justifications tend to argue that their behaviors
are not criminal as laws and regulations codifying
their behaviors as illegal may not exist, may be dated
or not enforced, or their applicability may be
questionable. For example, when a Westinghouse
executive on trial for price-fixing was asked
about his behavior, he responded, ‘‘Illegal? Yes,
but not criminal...I assumed that a criminal action
meant damaging someone, and we did not do that’’
(cf. Coleman, 1985). Individuals using this type of
justification are likely to deny any responsibility for
their acts because they may consider them as
harmless and victimless. Socialization justifications
occur when individuals attribute their behavior as
necessary for the betterment of the group. Individ-
uals adopting this justification may reason that their
unethical behaviors is important for the survival of
their groups, even if their actions are detrimental to
other groups and society as a whole. For instance,
the Westinghouse executive quoted above went
further to state that ‘‘I thought we were more or
less working on a survival basis in order to try to
make enough to keep our plants and employees’’
(cf. Coleman, 1985). This justification is very similar
to the ‘appeal to higher loyalties’ suggested by Sykes
and Matza (1957). Finally, ritualism justifications
include those neutralization techniques that maintain
that ‘everyone else is doing it.’ Individuals using this
justification reason that they are responsible for their
actions since they may consider their actions to
conform to the expectations of others (Ashforth and
Anand, 2003) or are merely following a pattern of
behavior accepted among their peers (Coleman,
1985).
In the following section, we discuss, in detail,
Weber’s ([1922] 1978) conceptualization of
authority. As suggested above, an organization’s
authority provides its members an opportunity for
organizational corruption. We then propose how
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opportunity, motivation, and justification interact to
increase the propensity to commit different acts of
organizational corruption.
Types of authority
Max Weber defines authority (‘domination’ or
Herrschaft) as ‘‘the probability that certain specific
command (or all commands) will be obeyed by a
given group of persons’’ ([1922] 1978, p. 212).
Hence, authority assumes voluntary compliance or
an interest in obedience. He further explains that
obedience is an obligation that is formal and one
follows it without regard to one’s own attitude or
lack of value of its content. For sustaining authority,
Weber emphasizes that it is essential that the
authority be believed to be legitimate (gains a right
to ‘rule’) and that there needs to be an immediate
relation between command and obedience. Probably
one of Weber’s most important contributions for
organizational theory is the theory that authority will
depend on four key factors: the type of legitimacy, the
type of obedience, the composition of the administra-
tive staff, and the mode of exercising authority. Based on
these four factors, Weber ([1922], 1978) argues that
three types of legitimate authority exist: (1) legal-
rational; (2) charismatic; and (3) traditional. We
discuss each of them in turn and provide a synthesis
of our discussion in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Main characteristics of Weberian authority
Dimensions of
Legitimation
Legal-Rational Authority Charismatic Authority Traditional Authority
Type of Obedience Legality of enacted rules Devotion to the exceptional
sanctity, heroism or exemplary
character of an individual person.
Sanctity of immemorial traditions
Impersonal and formal
order
Normative patterns and order
revealed and ordained by him.
E.g. ‘‘Owed to the person of the
chief who is bound by traditions’’
Recognition is freely given and
guaranteed by what is held to be
proof
Traditional status
Personal loyalty resulting from
common upbringing
Structure and
Administrative Staff
Hierarchical Charismatic community Staff related to the chief by tra-
ditional ties of loyalty:
Staff is separated from the
ownership of the means of
production.
No specialized training required - Gerontocracy or Primary
Patriarchalism: where the master
has no personal administrative
staff.
Chosen on charismatic qualifica-
tions; or provided charismatic
authority of the chief
- Patrimonalism (in extreme
cases, Sultanism): administration
and military force are purely
personal instruments of the mas-
ter.
- Estate-type: administrative staff
appropriates powers and the
corresponding economic assets.
Specialized training is nec-
essary
Basic training is hardly required
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Legal-rational authority
Legal-rational authority is built on the belief of the
legality of the rules enacted and the right of those
elevated to authority under such rules to issue
commands. Obedience is, therefore, owed to the
‘legally established impersonal order’ (Weber, [1922]
1978). In short, this authority is based on the rules
and hence on the office, rather than on the office-
holder. Orders are followed only if the rules require
that the commands of superiors be obeyed. This
aims to make the legal-rational form of authority
impersonal, objective, and based on equality.
Since authority is specified by the office, the
administrative staff (e.g., the firms’ managers) is
appointed on the basis of their technical qualifica-
tions and promoted according to the judgment of
their superiors. Organizations are, by definition,
designed around ‘clearly defined spheres of compe-
tence’ (Weber, [1922] 1978), where officials are
TABLE 1
continued
Dimensions of
Legitimation
Legal-Rational Authority Charismatic Authority Traditional Authority
Appointment by free
contract:
- Clearly defined sphere of
competence.
No fixed salary; no pension; no
benefices; Pursue satisfaction in a
typical anti-economic way.
Appointment by traditions
(‘‘Patrimonial’’ recruitment) or
favoritism:
- Conflicted tasks and ad hoc
powers assigned at the master’s
discretion.
Receive fixed salary and
pensions according to rank.
Succession based on the ‘‘search-
based’’ on criteria; revelations;
designation on part of original
leader; recognition by commu-
nity.
No fixed salary; based on the
master’s discretion, according to
the power assigned initially;
Promotions on the judg-
ment of superiors.
Promotions through seniority;
objectively determined achieve-
ments; social status; sense of sta-
tus honor.
Mode of Exercising
Authority
Domination through
knowledge obtained from
technical training, experi-
ence.
Formally concrete judgments are
newly created from case to case
and are originally regarded as
divine judgments and revelations;
Based on traditions or master’s
discretion in the sphere which
tradition leaves it open to him;
Knowledge of ‘‘official
secrets’’
Rights to appeal Charisma may effect a subjective
or internal reorientation born out
of suffering, conflicts, or enthu-
siasm (no rights to appeal)
Exercise of power based on how
far the master can go without
arousing resistance;
Rights of statement of
grievances from lower to
upper levels
Cases of complaints differ
in the ‘‘correct’’ ruling
from higher authority or
responsibility left to lower
offices.
The radical alternations may re-
sult in radical alterations of the
central attitudes and directions of
action with a completely new
orientation of all attitudes toward
problems of the world.
Resistance directed toward the
master and his servant personally
if they failed to observe the tra-
ditional limits.
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usually paid a fixed salary and even a pension, cor-
responding to their organizational rank. Thus,
hierarchical positions in the organization are con-
tingent on the technical competence of the officials,
and there exists a boundary-set hierarchy. Leaders
dominate or exercise their authority through the
knowledge that they gain due to their technical
expertise and their experiences in the organization.
The rules that are obeyed are usually written down
and recorded in official capacity. The rules, and
consequently the acts that follow, are added to the
organizational memory – a concept that was later
developed to describe the processes that an organi-
zation undertakes to store and retrieve data that it
was once attained (Anand et al., 1998).
According to Weber ([1922] 1978), the purest type
of exercise of legal-rational authority is that which
employs a bureaucratic administrative staff. Since the
staff is subject only to impersonal official obligations,
the bureaucracy adopts a hierarchical structure. Each
officer has a fixed status in the organization, and
hence, a clearly defined job profile. Candidates are
selected on the basis of their technical capabilities and
qualifications. They have fixed career paths contin-
gent on their position in the hierarchy and promotions
are mostly made on the basis of seniority and
achievement within the organizational boundaries.
Their jobs are very secure, and they can be terminated
only under exceptional circumstances. According to
Weber ([1922], 1978), one of the advantages of the
bureaucratic organization is that the administrative
staff is completely separated from the ownership of the
means of production, allowing the use of impersonal
and rational mechanisms to impose authority. This
separation also shifts the focus of the organization
toward the ends instead of the means.
The U.S. federal system of government is an
example of an organization with legal-rational
authority. The ‘rules’ in this organization are estab-
lished in the Constitution, which sets up the federal
system by dividing powers into three autonomous
branches. The executive branch, represented by the
office of the President of the United States, enforces
the law. The legislative branch, signified by the U.S.
Congress, develops and enacts legislation. And the
judicial branch, embodied by the Supreme Court,
interprets these laws, ensures that they are compatible
with the Constitution and applies them in different
social contexts. Each of these branches has limited
power and is kept under check by another branch.
For example, the President appoints judges and
departmental secretaries, but these appointments
must also be approved by the Senate. The Congress
can pass a law, but the President has the right to veto
it. The Supreme Court can rule a law to be uncon-
stitutional, but the Congress, with the States, can
potentially amend the Constitution. This exemplifies
Weber’s ([1922] 1978) ‘separation of powers.’
Charismatic authority
Charisma is defined as a certain quality of an indi-
vidual by which he or she is considered extraordi-
nary and treated as endowed with superhuman or
exceptional powers or qualities (Swedberg, 1998).
Charismatic authority arises from the charisma or
‘gift of grace’ of the leader (Weber, [1922] 1978). It
is up to the followers to recognize this characteristic
in leaders (the CEO and/or governing body) and to
act accordingly. The leader and his or her adminis-
trative staff influence the subjective reorientation of
the individuals (subordinates) from within. There-
fore, charismatic authority emerges due to the per-
sonal devotion to the leader/official, arising out of
enthusiasm, despair or hopes, and it will disappear if
success evades the leader for too long. The leader
makes judgments about situations and problems on a
case-by-case basis, and these are initially treated as
revelations or divine judgments by the followers
(Weber, [1922] 1978).
Since this form of authority exists due to the
emotional attachment to the leader in authority,
officials are perceived as volunteers who join the
organization out of an affinity toward the charisma
of the leaders (Swedberg, 1998). These officials
usually have no requirements for technical training
and are not bound by rules and/or hierarchies. They
also do not have fixed salaries, career paths, or job
profiles. Recruitment and promotion of charismatic
officials depends on their devotion to leaders such as
the top management team and the enthusiasm with
which they share the leader’s vision. The leader
appoints her or his administrative staff relying on the
charismatic characteristics of individuals.
We propose that Enron, the energy trading
company that has been the focus of media attention
since the corporate wrongdoing came to light in
2001, can be defined as an organization with
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charismatic authority. Enron’s CEO, Kenneth Lay
and ex-CEO, Jeffery Skilling can be considered
charismatic leaders. For instance, Watkins, the
now-famous Enron’s whistle-blower reports that
‘‘[Just] about everyone who met Lay for the first
time liked him, from world leaders to ministers in
Houston’s poorest neighborhoods’’ (Swartz and
Watkins, 2003, p. 16). Nathan Childs, former
Enron hardware technician, describes Kenneth Lay
as ‘‘Very caring, very giving, very personable –
maybe just like the guy next door’’ (see McLean
and Elkind, 2003). Watkins, while referring to
Skilling quotes:
It was Skilling who made the stock price ascend to
the heavens. So it was Skilling who made Enron’s
troops frantic to live in a fast-forward mode, who
made them anxious to prove that they could de-
liver any concept he could dream up, who made
them desperate to tag along on his extreme
adventures – rock climbing, bungee jumping –
around the globe. Because if Jeff Skilling thought
you ‘got it’, you really did (Swartz and Watkins,
2003, p. 12).
These quotes suggest that Enron employees may
have legitimized the authority of Lay and Skilling by
exhibiting their personal devotion toward these
individuals. Thus, the type of obedience at Enron
seems to be based on the charismatic authority of its
leaders. Describing the mode of exercising authority
at Enron, Watkins notes that Skilling had a relentless
push for creativity and competitiveness and fostered
a growth-at-any-cost culture at Enron (Swartz and
Watkins, 2003). Regarding new hires, one manager
who helped with recruiting at Enron stated, ‘‘It was
not your typical, hard-working, extracurricular-
activities type of student...It was a sharp-dressing
extrovert, someone who would fit in as a ruthless
trader. We weren’t looking for softies’’ (see McLean
and Elkind, 2003), thus highlighting the role of the
leader in hiring new recruits based on ‘search-based
criteria.’ This indicates that the authority at Enron
was of the charismatic type.
Traditional authority
Traditional authority is ‘the right to rule’ by virtue of
passed down rules and orders, regardless of the
person’s technical abilities or charisma properties.
This type of legitimate authority relies mostly on the
‘sanctity of immemorial traditions and customs’
(Weber, [1922] 1978) that the organization follows.
In this case, the leader can be the one to follow these
inherited norms or traditions, or the leader can be
the one to set these customs and, thus, initiate a
tradition. The latter case usually occurs during the
initial years of the organization. However, the leader
can utilize his or her powers as long as there is no
resistance from subordinates.
In traditional authority, whenever there is a fail-
ure to follow the traditional rules, resistance is
directed toward the leader and her administrative
staff. The leaders appoint their administrative staff
either by following traditions or by favoritism. There
are, thus, two types of recruitments: ‘Patrimonial’
which involves hiring mostly members of ruling
clans or slaves who follow traditions, and ‘Extra-
patrimonial’ which includes hiring mostly favorites
and people who volunteer to follow the traditions
(Weber, [1922] 1978). In most cases, initially, the
administrative staff is composed of ‘house-hold
officials’ who eat at the leader’s table (i.e., the leader
pays them out of his or her pocket) (Swedberg,
1998). Administrative staff is selected through
favoritism and their roles are ad hoc and overlapping,
but always decided by the leader. As the organization
grows, some patrimonial officials can no longer eat at
the leader’s table and are paid by some other means,
namely, benefices (Pfru¨nden). In this sense, unlike in
organizations with legal-rational authority, there is
no hierarchy in these organizations and no require-
ments for technical expertise. The complexity of this
ideal-type authority stems from the two-step
dependence on the leader (i.e., being at the dinner
table or not at the dinner table).
We suggest that Adelphia Communications is an
illustration of an organization with traditional
authority. Adelphia was a family-run firm with
founder John Rigas as CEO and Chairman of the
Board, son Tim Rigas as CFO, second son Michael
Rigas as VP of Operations, third son James Rigas as
VP of Strategic Planning, and son-in-law Peter
Venetis as member of the Board of Directors. In
total, the Rigas family held five of the nine board
seats. They also filled the other four seats on the
board with John Rigas’ friends and business associ-
ates. Thus, the administrative staff, in Swedberg’s
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(1998) words was ‘related to the chief by the tradi-
tional ties of loyalty.’ Regarding the mode of exer-
cising authority, Tom Cady, a former Adelphia sales
and marketing executive says: ‘‘Decisions were made
at the dinner table rather than in a boardroom or
somebody’s office,’’ (cf. Leonard et al., 2002) which
is typical of an organization with traditional
authority (Weber, [1922] 1978).
In the following section, we present the mecha-
nisms (the interactions of opportunity, motivation,
and justification) by which individuals in the various
ideal-type authorities engage in different types of
organizational corruption. It is important to note
that just as these forms of authority are ideal-types
and may not exist in real life, the mechanisms and
outcomes outlined below are also ideal-types for the
sake of theory building.
Corruption antecedents, mechanisms,
and outcomes
We have discussed the different legitimate ideal-type
authorities that organizational leaders might endorse.
We now explore how these leaders might bring to
bear the dark side of authority, that is, the use
of authority for personal use, or corruption. In this
section, we discuss how and why individuals in
organizations with these different types of authority
commit acts of organizational corruption due to the
salience of different motives and justification tech-
niques. We use Weber’s ([1922] 1978) construct of
authority to develop the Opportunity pillar in the
Opportunity-Motivation-Justification model, but by
considering the dark side of authority, in order to
understand the antecedents of the corruptive
behavior and its outcomes.
We propose that individuals who commit orga-
nizational corruption are likely to engage in one of
these three types of corruption: procedural, sche-
matic, and categorical (see Luo, 2004 for similar
distinctions). Specifically, we argue that individuals
in organizations with legal-rational authority and
driven by individualistic motives will use rationali-
zation to engage in procedural outcomes of
corruption, those in organizations with charismatic
authority and driven by collectivistic motives will
use socialization to engage in schematic outcomes,
and those in organizations with traditional authority
and driven by relational motives will use ritualism to
engage in categorical outcomes of corruption. We
discuss each of these below.
Procedural corruption
Procedural corruption results from either the lack of
formalized procedures or formal ‘rules’ of business conduct
in the organization, or from the violation of existing
formal procedures, for personal gain. In other words,
when employees at all or some levels of the orga-
nization do not follow or are not mandated to
follow (ethical) procedures of business conduct, the
corrupt outcome is defined as procedural corrup-
tion. For example, consider an organization in
which the code of ethics is nonexistent. In such
organizations, employees may not be encouraged to
follow ethical standards to conduct business,
resulting in procedural corruption due to the lack
of any (ethical) rules. Newly started entrepreneurial
firms are likely to be exposed to this type of cor-
ruption. Procedural corruption usually occurs when
there is a high dependence within groups or
members of the same status, and also when there
are high standards of accountability with regards to
the ultimate goals but not the means (Trice and
Beyer, 1993). Procedural corruption results from
the malfeasance of one or more members at any
level of an organization for their personal benefits
by bending the established rules or due to the lack
of any rules. Moreover, in some organizations,
certain subunit managers might feel that they need
to use illicit means to meet their goals because of
the pressure of industry norms or because of purely
economic reasons (such as to gain competitive
advantage). Therefore, as more subunits use illicit
means to obtain their goals and are not checked by
the organization, the use of corrupt means becomes
an unspoken rule. Procedural corruption is likely to
cause tremendous damage to the organization
because the entire organization is blamed for the
corrupt acts of its members and, may face dire
consequences in terms of economic and reputation
loss.
Unlike organizations with charismatic or tradi-
tional authority, organizations with legal-rational
authority draw on formalized rules, and its members
are selected on the basis of competence and pro-
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moted according to seniority (Weber, [1922] 1978),
which gives them an opportunity to commit crimes
that violate the formalized rules of the organization.
Now, if these members are driven by individualistic
motives and are able to justify their behavior with
rationalization, they are more likely to commit
procedural corruption than those who have different
motives and justifications. Organization members
with individualistic motives are more likely to view
their organizations as a good opportunity to commit
crimes that benefit themselves, in contrast to mem-
bers with collectivistic and relational motives who
are concerned with benefiting the organization or
subunit respectively, particularly if they can justify
their behaviors as not causing any injury or absence
of victims. The legal-rational authority thus provides
the self-interested members, who can validate their
‘bending of the rules’ as lacking any injury or any
victim (Ashforth and Anand, 2003), with the
appropriate platform to commit procedural corrup-
tion such that they are benefited themselves. Also, if
the procedures are absent, these members are more
likely to engage in procedural corruption because
they are more likely to seek personal gains due to
their individualistic motives, and the lack of rules
gives them the justification that no one is harmed by
their actions since there are no rules suggesting that
their actions are considered illegal or detrimental to
others. Thus, we propose that
Proposition 1: Members of organizations with legal-
rational authority, driven by individualistic motives and
who are able to justify their behaviors through
rationalization are more likely to engage in procedural
corruption than members of organizations with
other types of authority, driven by other motives and
justifications.
Schematic corruption
Corruption is said to be schematic when it is structured
and present uniformly throughout the organization (Luo,
2004). In other words, schematic corruption results
due to the simultaneous involvement of multiple
organizational levels in corrupt acts and at multiple
points in time. The repetition of a corrupt act is
reinforced by mechanisms that make them seem
normal and part of the organizational culture.
Schematic corruption may also occur due to the
norms of the institutional environment in which the
organization is embedded. For example, if the
organizational environment requires frequent brib-
ery and pay-offs to politicians and bureaucrats for
conducting daily business, the corruption will
become part of the modus operandi, which we define
as schematic corruption. The necessary condition is
the existence of upper leadership pressure on orga-
nizational members and subunits to follow these
(unethical) rules and norms (Luo, 2004). The need
for organizational corruption is usually recognized
from early years of the members’ tenure at the
organization. The leaders (e.g., the CEOs) usually
face severe consequences for their acts even though
the organization faces some losses itself. Schematic
corruption cannot be checked internally since the
entire organization has accepted it as a norm.
Authority in organizations with charismatic
authority is based on the charisma of the leader and
the faith that followers or subordinates have in their
leaders. Therefore, in organizations with charismatic
authority, the followers identify with the leader and
the collective mission of the organization, and may
perceive the latter to express important aspects of
their self-concepts. When these members are driven
by collectivistic motives and are able to justify their
behaviors through socialization, they are more likely
to engage in corruption that involves the entire
organizational fabric. Members of organizations with
charismatic authority behaving mostly in response to
collectivistic motives, as opposed to individualistic
and relational motives, are more likely to show blind
faith in the leader and his or her actions (Howell and
Shamir, 2005). Research shows that charismatic
leaders tend to influence either the subordinates’
personal or social identifications, resulting in an in-
crease in productivity and efficiency of the organi-
zational members. For instance, Waldman et al.
(2004) find that CEO charisma was related to sub-
sequent organizational performance as measured by
net profit margin and return on equity. However, if
members of such organizations are able to justify
their behaviors as contributing to the betterment of
the organization, they are more likely to engage in
schematic corruption that implicates the entire
organization. They may, thus, undertake corrupt
activities due to a blind belief in the leader and due
to the assumption that their acts will ultimately
benefit the organization.
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As noted, Enron is an illustration of how a cor-
poration with charismatic authority can produce
schematic corruption. The involvement of Enron
officials in organizational corruption brought about
the fall and bankruptcy for the entire organization
(schematic corruption). The earlier quotations of
whistle-blower Watkins suggest that members of
Enron may have been driven by collectivistic mo-
tives toward the organization. Watkins, describing
the rationale that company employees may have
used to justify their actions, states that ‘‘[You] push
your employees to constantly innovate, they finally
get backed into a corner where they become too
creative’’ (Swartz and Watkins, 2003). This suggests
that executives involved in the schematic fraud may
have contributed to the downfall of Enron by jus-
tifying their behavior as one involving creative
solutions for the betterment of the organization
exemplifying the socialization technique of justifi-
cation. Therefore, we propose that
Proposition 2: Members of organizations with
charismatic authority, driven by collectivistic motives and
who are able to justify their behaviors through
socialization are more likely to engage in schematic
corruption than members of organizations with
other types of authority, driven by other motives and
justifications.
Categorical corruption
Categorical corruption is the result of concentrated and
delimited acts of corruption within the organization. For
example, suppose there is a large multinational cor-
poration consisting of several subsidiaries that are
highly diversified geographically. In the case of
subsidiaries located in countries with an expectation
that unethical or corrupt means will be used to
survive, corruption is likely to be concentrated in
only those particular subsidiaries. Therefore, one
observes concentrated or categorical acts of corrup-
tion in such multinational corporations. These
instances of organizational corruption can be cate-
gorical at specific (higher or lower) levels, units or
geographical locations of the organization, rather
than extensive and found throughout the organiza-
tion. These acts mostly occur in organizations with
highly decentralized structures. Specific subgroups
(e.g., subunits or hierarchical levels) may be corrupt
due to strong environmental pressures, pressures
from the organization and senior managers to meet
some particular goals, or simply, mismanagement
(Luo, 2004). Since corruption tends to be highly
concentrated in these organizations, there are very
few diffusion effects. That is, if corruption in a
particular subgroup is exposed, then that subgroup is
blamed for the act with severe penalties imposed by
the central organization. In some cases, the organi-
zation will disown the corrupt subgroup to protect
the entire organization from the repercussions of the
misconduct of a few. Also, cases of categorical cor-
ruption are easily detected by others in the organi-
zation and therefore, the leaders (e.g., CEO and/or
other senior managers) can keep a check on the
category before the effects of corruption are mag-
nified.
Members of organizations with traditional
authority are either patrimonial or extra-patrimonial.
In the former case, they may be directly supported
by the leader or, as in the latter case, may receive
benefices from the leader. The belief in the traditions
laid down by the leader is usually greater in the
former than in the latter case. Therefore, members in
organizations with traditional authority tend to be
driven by relational motives toward the leader or the
organization when the traditional authority is patri-
monial, and toward the subunit, when it is extra-
patrimonial. Hence, if the leader and the adminis-
trative staff follow unethical means to conduct
business, the close associates are more likely to do
the same if they are able to justify their actions as
being part of the norm. In this case, members who
are extra-patrimonial are less likely to engage in such
acts due to the lack of relational motivation. For
instance, if we consider Adelphia as an example of a
corporation with traditional authority, in which five
of the nine board members were from the founding
Rigas family (Leonard et al., 2002), then when these
founding members were accused of committing a
given corporate crime that personally benefited
them, we could categorize their crimes as categorical
corruption.
As discussed, when the members move away from
the ‘master’s table’ (Swedberg, 1998), their loyalty to
the leader is likely to decrease. Their relational
motives are now not directed toward the leader or
the organization, but are directed toward the subunit
to which they belong. Therefore, if other members
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of this subunit engage in corruption, these members
are more likely to be corrupt. This is because the
relational motivation of these members is with the
subunit and their justification is likely to be of rit-
ualism at the subunit level. In such a case, members
belonging to the patrimonial unit may not engage in
corruption. In either situation, the corruption is said
to be categorical. We thus propose that
Proposition 3: Members of organizations with tra-
ditional authority, driven by relational motives and who
are able to justify their behaviors through ritualism
are more likely to engage in categorical corruption
than members of organizations with other types of
authority, driven by other motives and justifications.
Discussion and conclusion
Corruption refers to the abuse of authority for
personal benefit. When applied to the organiza-
tional level, we find that Weber’s three ideal-types
of authority can help us unpack the opportunity
pillar of the Opportunity-Motivation-Justification
model and, in turn, explore the likelihood of
different types of corporate misdeeds. In particular,
we propose that the three ideal-types of authority
(legal-rational, charismatic, and traditional) interact
simultaneously with different types of motivation
(individualistic, relational, and collectivistic) and
justifications (rationalization, socialization, and rit-
ualism) to result in three distinct types of organi-
zational corruption (procedural, schematic, and
categorical). Empirically, we realize that no orga-
nization has a particular authority in the pure form,
nor will its members follow a pure motive or
justification technique to engage in a pure cor-
ruption outcome. However, it is important to
note that the type of corruption mechanism that
an organizational member or group utilizes will
depend on the salience of each of the components
in the Opportunity-Motivation-Justification model
and their combined effect. We also acknowledge
that the three types of authority, motives, and
justifications may interact such that it can poten-
tially lead to 27 different types of organizational
corruption. However, in this article, we focus on
the most salient and conceptually linear outcomes
obtained by three particular combinations of
authority, motivation, and justification. We do
not make any predictions about other possible
combinations.
Additionally, most organizations allow for some
flexibility in the interpretation of their rules. In
effect, Barnard’s (1938) classic book, The Functions
of the Executive, suggests that part of the job of an
executive is to adapt to new circumstances in order
to achieve effectiveness, in the sense of organiza-
tional purpose, and efficiency, in the sense of satis-
fying individual needs. It is, however, difficult to
assess whether executives’ deviation from organiza-
tional norms is due to the need to be flexible and
adaptable, or is mostly due to the need to reap
personal benefits that accrue to the official. This
choice can further be understood by focusing on the
authority of an organization which is at the core of
this article.
Managerial and policy implications
One might ask how our proposed theoretical model
of organizational corruption can help policy makers
to keep managers ‘honest’ and restore investors’ trust
in the invisible hand of the market. First, our model
shows that the type of authority that leaders endorse
in organizations, in combination with their moti-
vation and justification, will determine whether
corporate misdeeds are likely to remain centralized
or spread through the organizational system.
Second, as Finkelstein and Mooney (2003)
astutely point out, ‘the usual suspects’ of classic good
corporate governance looked almost ‘stellar’ in
companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Global
Crossing, and Tyco before they collapsed. This
shows the need to go beyond the organizational- or
country-level rules of corporate governance and
beyond focusing solely on the abuse of legal-rational
authority. Leaders can perfectly conform to the
established legal norms and yet abuse their traditional
authority for personal benefit. For example, they
may not distribute the dividends fairly to share-
holders in a family-owned business. Thus, as many
of the scholars of ethics have asserted (Seidman,
2004; Weaver, 2004), it is necessary to address the
deeper opportunities (authorities), motivations and
justifications behind corruption, and how their
interactions will play out in order to have a signifi-
cant change in behavior (and misbehavior).
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Interestingly, in recent times, issues have been
raised regarding the benefits of ethical leadership and
training. For example, as an invited executive in the
Academy of Management Executive (May 2004 issue),
Perry Martini stated: ‘‘Unfortunately, ethics training
has often failed to achieve its desired outcome be-
cause it has addressed external behaviors, rather than
the root cause of an inappropriate business practice
and workplace behavior.’’ (p. 54). We believe that
one of the main reasons for this failure of ethics
training and ethical leadership in organizations is that
organizational researchers and ethics trainers have
not systematically distinguished between the three
types of Weberian authority. Since the mechanisms
of the three types of authority differ, the importance
and applicability of the ethical leadership is also likely
to vary contingent on the type of authority.
For example, organizations with legal-rational
authority mostly rely on rules and procedures for the
conduct of business. Therefore, in these cases, ethical
leadership is not going to play a major role in
inculcating the importance of ethics in employees;
more fundamental and deeper changes in rules and
the consequences of breaking the rules may be more
enduring. Conversely, ethics training and ethical
leadership would probably be more effective in
organizations with charismatic authority since
employees in such organizations believe in the
leaders and look to them for their values, beliefs, and
norms. Similarly, ethical leadership would probably
be most helpful in the case of traditional authority.
Future research
We would like to highlight some areas that are a
natural progression from this article and deserve
future examination. First, reputational intermediar-
ies, such as auditing firms, bond rating agencies or
stock analysts, play an important role in the moni-
toring system because they sell ‘trust’ and because
shareholder/stakeholder democracy is a ‘fiction’ in
the majority of corporate governance systems. In
most of the recent scandals, these organizational
actors have cooperated with the focal abusers of
authority by providing false or misleading informa-
tion. Future research should explore the direct and
indirect effects of these intermediaries in reinforcing
the dark side of authority of officers in power. Both
Gourevitch (2002) and Windolf (2004) provide
some interesting theoretical ideas in this direction by
emphasizing the collective action problem and
information asymmetries, respectively.
Second, we see future research extending into
institutional theory to explore how social action can
be changed with regards to the abuse of authority in
organizations. Institutional theory offers valuable
insights about institutional change (Ahmadjiam and
Robinson, 2001; Davis et al., 1994; Greenwood
et al., 1990; Leblebici et al., 1991) and when and
how socially ‘deviant’ or illegitimate actions diffuse
or are eradicated (see Westphal et al., 1997). We
suspect that institutional arguments for social change
such as coercive institutional forces (i.e., rules, norms
and power structures that constrain choice), nor-
mative institutional forces (i.e., shared values and
integrative social fabric) and mimetic institutional
forces (i.e., shared cognitive maps) (Scott, 2001)
could guide theoretical arguments regarding legal-
traditional, charismatic and traditional authority. For
example, in the case of leaders with charismatic
authority, one could argue that in order to change
their social actions away from corruption, we would
need to change the normative institutions or com-
munity shared values of what is morally accepted.
This could be achieved by introducing, and ulti-
mately institutionalizing, strong non-corrupt values
in their professional associations that in time would
be accepted by the charismatic leader and socialized
throughout the firm.
Third, future research could also empirically test
our proposed theoretical model by operationalizing
the dominant type of authority that leaders have
within corporations. This could be done by first
disentangling the independent variable, authority,
into the four dimensions as suggested by Weber:
type of legitimation, type of obedience, kind of
administrative staff, and mode of exercising the
authority. Then, the relationships between these
four dimensions and the three motivations (indi-
vidualistic, collectivistic, and relational) and justi-
fication techniques (rationalization, socialization,
and ritualism) and three outcomes of corruption
(procedural, schematic, and categorical) could be
tested.
Fourth, there are multiple situational variables
such as institutional norms and environmental
uncertainty as well as social and economical factors,
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such as financial health of the firm, which can
influence the relationships we proposed. Empirical
research testing our model should account for these
situational variables. Research testing our proposi-
tions should also be cautious when coding the types
of authority in organizations since most organiza-
tions can have multiple authorities at once, but
only one is predominant at any given time.
Finally, we also encourage more in depth quali-
tative work and systematic case studies like the
accounts of Time person of the year and Enron’s
whistle-blower, Ms. Sherron S. Watkins (Watkins,
2003) because they shed bright light into the
dynamics and content of organizational deviant
behavior.
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Notes
1 We thank two of the reviewers for their sugges-
tions and comments on the justification part of the
model.
2 For distinctions between the constructs of authority,
influence, power, and leadership, please refer to Uphoff
(1989) and Grimes (1978). Authority primarily entails
voluntary compliance on behalf of the subordinates such
that obedience of the leaders’ commands is seen as an
obligation that is formal and followed through without
regard to one’s own attitude. On the other hand, influ-
ence or power may be exercised when there is no vol-
untary conformity or when the formal orders from the
leaders are being questioned. Furthermore, influence
may also be adopted by the subordinates toward their
leaders. Thus, influence can be bidirectional, whereas
power and authority are considered to be unidirec-
tional. More importantly, leaders are agents of authority
who underscore the authority of the organizations to
which they belong. Apart from adopting authority to
seek obedience, leaders may thus also use power or
influence. It should also be noted that although it may
be difficult to distinguish between authority, power,
influence, and leadership empirically, they are concep-
tually very distinct constructs.
3 We thank two of our reviewers for making this
pointed suggestion.
4 Weber uses the terms ‘leader’ and ‘administrative
staff’ as agents of authority and ‘officials’ to signify their
subordinates. However, while relating his ideas to the
modern organization, we use ‘managers,’ ‘organizational
members,’ and ‘leaders’ interchangeably to denote the
agents of authority.
5 Although discussing motivation in the order of
individualistic, relational, and collectivistic seems pref-
erable, we alter the sequence to individualistic, col-
lectivistic, and relational to be consistent with our
propositions related to authority and motivation
types.
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